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ABSTRACT 
This paper explores the interaction between a prominent board of directors and the network of inter-
firm relationships on new product development. Specifically, we posit a positive interaction effect 
between a prominent board and the inter-firm network and structural holes positions on the number 
of new products developed by the firm. We test the theoretical framework on a sample of 1,758 
agreements among 1,890 biopharmaceutical firms over the period 2006-2010. We find that by 
filtering, complementing and legitimizing information coming from the inter-firm network, a 
prominent interlocking directorate network can improve the inter-firm network’s effects on new 
product development. We discuss important implications for how inter-personal networks (such as 
the board interlock directorate network) help to develop the effectiveness of inter-firm relationship 
networks in achieving new product development outcomes.    
 
Keywords: Inter-firm network, Interlocking directorate network, Innovation, New product 
development, Biopharmaceutical industry. 
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1. Introduction  
Whilst we now understand more about how individual networks impact the firm‟s 
performance, a recent trend in network research has shifted to investigating network effects 
on business outcomes across multiple networks (Ozmel et al., 2013). More specifically, 
management literature has investigated – independently - the impact of inter-personal 
networks, such as the interlocking directorate networks, and the inter-firm relationship 
networks on firm performance. Interlocking directorate networks act as an inter-personal 
channel by which information and knowledge resources are exchanged (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978) to the benefit of the firm. Literature in this field has mainly focused on examining how 
the interlocking directorate networks affect economic and financial performance (Dalton et 
al., 1999; Peng and Luo, 2000; Non and Franses, 2007; Pombo and Gutiérrez, 2011; 
Kaczmarek et al., 2012; Horton et al., 2012; Croci and Grassi, 2013; Larcker et al., 2013; Li et 
al., 2013), enhance superior innovation performance (Wincent et al., 2010), influence 
strategic alliance formation (Gulati and Westphal, 1999), contribute to the strategic decision 
making process (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001), and finally foster internal innovation or 
external innovation (Hoskisson et al., 2002). Similarly, a lot of research has highlighted the 
importance of inter-firm network structural positions on the firm‟s performance.  Indeed, 
according to social capital literature, the inter-firm network is itself a source of valuable 
resources through which the firm can improve its performance (Ahuja, 2000; Koka and 
Prescott, 2002; Soh, 2003; Salman and Saives, 2005; Zaheer and Bell, 2005; Maurer and 
Ebers, 2006; Acquaah, 2007; Wu, 2008; Schilling and Phelp, 2007; Gilsing et al., 2008; 
Padula, 2008; Vanhaverbeke et al., 2009; Phelps, 2010; Malik, 2011; Vanhaverbeke et al., 
2012). 
 However, it remains unresolved how the benefits delivered through inter-personal 
networks can be channeled to improve the delivery of business outcomes in inter-firm level 
networks. A possible exception in literature is Wang et al., 2014. The study by Wang et al., 
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(2014) investigates two different networks, i.e. social networks of researchers and networks of 
knowledge elements and their relation to the firm‟s propensity to patent. This study examines 
the impact of two different inter-personal networks (social network and knowledge network) 
on innovative performance.  
Our study investigates the interaction effect of an important inter-personal network 
(interlocking directorate) and inter-firm network (inter-firm ties such as alliances) on the 
firm‟s innovative performance. To the best of our knowledge, no studies so far have 
investigated the interaction effect of these two kinds of networks on firm„s innovation 
performance.  
In exploring this issue we build on the notion of structural network position as the 
source of advantageous benefits such as information sources and exchange of knowledge and 
resources (Koka and Prescott, 2002). But we also note that advantageous structural network 
positions, such as prominent and structural holes positions, have possible drawbacks such as 
information redundancy (in the case of prominence) and lack of specialization and focus (in 
the case of structural holes) (Ahuja, 2000; Vanhaverbeke et al., 2009; Malik, 2011). These 
drawbacks limit the full potential of any positive impact that the aforementioned network 
positions have on the firm‟s innovation performance. Our intuition is that firms with two 
prominent networks can use the benefits derived from one network to counterweigh the 
drawbacks in another network and so realize full business outcomes. In our study, we argue 
that a firm having a prominent inter-personal network position (i.e. the interlocking 
directorate network) achieved through extensive direct and indirect board ties, can use 
information assets at its disposal at the board level to reduce potential drawbacks encountered 
in the firm‟s inter-firm network by filtering, complementing and legitimizing information that 
is used by the firm to achieve innovation outcomes  (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Hillman and 
Dalziel, 2003).  
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Thus, our research contributes to the recent social capital (SC) literature trend that 
explores multiple network effects on business outcomes (e.g. Ozmel et al., 2013) by 
developing a theoretical argument of how an inter-personal network (the board interlock 
directorate network) inter-acts with an inter-firm network (such as alliances) to enhance 
innovation outcomes. In addition, we empirically validate this framework.  
In this study we specifically focus on new product development (NPD) performance 
as a measure of innovation outcome, because of its importance in our research context – the 
biopharmaceutical industry. Past research in this industry has considered NPD as a good 
proxy of innovation outcomes because developing new products provides successful firms 
with monopoly rents for 10-15 years (Rothaermel, 2001; George et al., 2001; Rothaermel, 
2002; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004; Lim et al., 2006). Hence, in the biopharmaceutical 
industry, NPD is increasingly a focal point of competition and often requires the development 
and successful implementation of novel process technologies that ensures firms achieve their 
ultimately economic objectives such as cash, market share and competitive advantages 
(Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988). As a result NPD has been considered as a key variable 
in alliance studies and has been utilized to address the impact of alliances in the innovation 
performance of the firm (Rothaermel, 2001; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004; Faems et al., 2005; 
Perks and Jeffery, 2006; Nieto and Santamaria, 2007). However, despite its importance in the 
biopharmaceutical industry and its relevance in alliance literature, past studies employing 
network theory to link network structural dimensions to innovation outcomes have mostly 
neglected NPD as a dependent variable by concentrating more on patents as the measure of 
innovation performance (Ahuja, 2000; Salman and Saives, 2004; Shilling and Phelps, 2007; 
Gilsing et al., 2008; Padula, 2008; Phelps, 2010; Vanhaverbeke et al., 2009; Karamanos, 
2012; Vanhaverbeke et al., 2012). An important exception is the recent study of Mazzola et 
al. (2015), in which the authors hypothesize a positive effect of some structural embeddedness 
network positions of the firm in its inter-firm networks on firm's NPD performance in the 
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biopharmaceutical industry. The paper‟s empirical analysis shows that a prominent position of 
the firm in its network positively affects NPD performance, while structural holes positions 
seem to not effect NPD performance. Similarly, Wincent et al. (2010) show how high levels 
of board interlocking directorates have positive effects on innovation performance related to 
new product development. These recent studies enforce the importance of the contribution of 
this research. Indeed, while literature has acknowledged the relevance of inter-personal and 
inter-firm networks on improving NPD performance, no studies have focused on the 
interaction effects of these two networks like we do in this paper.  
We test our theoretical framework on a set of 300 public companies in the 
biopharmaceutical industry and we get a positive confirmation of our hypotheses. Indeed, our 
results show how a prominent position of the firm's board in the directorates network 
reinforces the positive impact on NPD performance that prominent and structural holes 
positions in the firm's inter-organizational network have on the same performance variable. 
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we develop the theoretical 
framework and a set of hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the research methodology and the 
dataset, and section 4 presents the model specification. In section 5 results of the empirical 
investigations are shown, while discussion about the contribution of this research and 
conclusions are presented in section 6. 
 
2. Theory and hypotheses 
In recent decades, SC theorists have elucidated why network benefits arise from the firm‟s 
structural positions – both theoretically and empirically. A firm can benefit from its network 
by accessing critical information in the network through multiple ties with many partners, i.e. 
through prominent positions (Koka and Prescott, 2008). First, firms pursuing prominence in 
the network have advantages arising from accessing key and valuable information available in 
the network. Indeed, a prominent position facilitates the exchange of a high volume of 
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information and knowledge assets that the firm can use to its competitive advantage 
(Granovetter, 1973; Koka and Prescott, 2002). However, network prominence benefits go 
beyond access to include those based on affiliation; indeed such a position enables the firm to 
influence its partners in ways that enable it to pursue and establish its own strategic agenda, 
thus enhancing its own performance (Koka and Prescott, 2008). As Podolny (2001) points 
out, being included in several inter-firm relations is also a signaling device that denotes 
prominence and influence (Zamudio et al., 2014) and signals quality and status (Ozmel et al., 
2013).  
A prominent position depends on the prominence of firms connected to it (Ruhnau, 
2000; Koka and Prescott, 2002; Koka and Prescott, 2008; Zamudio, et al., 2014). Prominent 
firms in networks benefit from accessing potentially valuable external information from all 
companies other than its immediate partners (Soh, 2003), from developing greater capacity to 
monitor their external environment and from finding new information and knowledge (Ahuja, 
2000). Most of the empirical studies that examine the impact of network prominent positions 
employ a range of firm„s innovation output types as the dependent variable. These studies 
include the positive predictions of network prominence on patenting frequency (Ahuja, 2000), 
number of product awards (Soh, 2003), patenting propensity (Salman and Saives, 2005), 
innovative output (Schilling and Phelps, 2007), non-core technology patent citations 
(Vanhaverbeke et al., 2012), and new product development (Mazzola et al., 2015). Indeed, the 
firm's prominence in its own industry has been positively associated with higher exploitative 
and explorative learning processes (Atuahene-Gima and Murray, 2007) that are 
acknowledged as highly influential in product development (Katila and Ahuia, 2002). 
Prominent firms develop capabilities in dealing with inter-firm relationships (Anand and 
Khanna, 2000; Kale and Singh, 2007; Wang and Zajac, 2007) that can be useful to improve 
collaborative product development processes. In addition, prominent firms, thanks to their 
reputation and status, can firstly and easily reach the most influential suppliers and hence 
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access the best knowledge and capabilities for making the NPD process more successful 
(Primo and Amundson, 2002; Petersen et al., 2003; Ragatz et al., 2003; Oke et al., 2008; 
Mazzola and Perrone, 2013); finally, thanks to their experience and knowledge about the 
network, they can better select the most aligned patents or technologies that can trigger or 
strengthen the NPD process (Geum et al., 2013).  
Structural holes represent the second key structural network position that affects the 
firm‟s innovation performance (Burt, 1992; Ahuja, 2000; Burt, 2004; Zaheer and Bell, 2005; 
Padula, 2008). Structural holes are gaps in information flows created when two unrelated 
firms are linked to the same ego firm but not to each other. The firm that bridges unconnected 
firms will be able to potentially access novel and diverse information that might positively 
affect the firm‟s innovation performance (Burt, 1992; 2004; Koka and Prescott, 2002). 
Structural holes provide connections with so-called weak ties which may be partners 
operating in different industries, markets or technologies (Gilsing and Nooteboom, 2005) or 
just simply diverse and non-redundant information from partners that help companies to 
increase the innovation performance (Ahuja, 2000; Koka and Prescott, 2002; Rothaermael 
and Deeds, 2004; Gilsing et al., 2008).  
Empirical research on structural holes and their impact on innovation outcomes has 
produced mixed results that seem to depend on the type of innovation performance 
investigated. For example, Ahuja (2000) finds a negative relationship between bridging 
structural holes and the ability of the firm to develop new patents, while Padula (2008) finds 
that a firm occupying a position that bridges network clusters is able to improve its patent 
propensity. With regards to research that employs NPD as dependent variable, previous 
literature recognizes that structural holes may facilitate the development of new products 
(Mazzola et al., 2015). Structural holes provides connections with unusual ties operating in 
different industries, markets or technologies and access to diverse and non-redundant 
information that help companies to develop new ideas and technologies for developing new 
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products (Hargadon and Sutton, 1997; Zaheer and Bell, 2005). For example, Hargadon and 
Sutton (1997) describe a process of brainstorming in which IDEO‘s employees use 
technological solutions from one industry to solve client issues in their own industry where 
the solutions are rare or unknown. IDEO‘s employees, act as technology brokers in different 
industries to improve the firm‘s likelihood of developing new products. Following such 
reasoning, Mazzola et al. (2015) hypothesize a positive influence of structural holes positions, 
in a network of inter-firm relationships, on firm‘s NPD performance. Through an empirical 
analysis they found that bridging structural holes does not seem to influence firm's NPD 
performance. In summary, mixed empirical results from past studies on the link between 
structural holes positions and product innovation may therefore point to the presence of an 
interacting factor, a gap that our study seeks to explore. 
 
2.1 The interaction of the board’s prominence with the inter-firm network positions 
The interlocking directorate network and the inter-firm network are two important networks 
that have individually a positive effect on the innovation performance of the firm.  
Regarding the interlocking directorate network, literature on the board function outlines how 
the firm‟s board members are themselves providers of resources to the firm – reputation or 
prominence being one such key resource (Hillman and Daziel, 2003). In the resource 
provision function, the board provides advice and counsel on important matters such as 
strategy formulation, access to information from outside the firm, preferential access to 
valuable resources that may be obtained through the board members‟ personal contacts, skills 
and expertise and legitimacy (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Each board director has an 
individual interlock directorate network that is the sum of the actual and potential resources 
embedded within, available through, and derived from the network of (direct and indirect) 
relationships possessed by the director as a result of sitting on boards of other companies. The 
SC aspects of the board, in its resource provision function, are obtained by aggregating the 
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individual director SC to the board level (Haynes and Hillman, 2010). Given that information 
obtained through the board network affects other networks through such mechanisms as 
strategy formulation or provision of expert opinion by board members, to get a more complete 
understanding of the determinants of the firm‟s innovation performance, we need to 
investigate what board networks bring to the firm and how they interact with the firm‟s other 
key networks such as its inter-firm network and the effect of this interaction on the firm‟s 
frequency to develop new products.  
 Several scholars have established the importance of a prominent board on the firm‟s 
economic-financial performance broadly (Non and Franses, 2007; Horton et al., 2012; Croci 
and Grassi, 2013; Larcker et al., 2013; Li et al., 2013) and on NPD, in particular (Wincent et 
al., 2010). Germane to this study, a prominent board positively influences both the firms‟ 
process and product innovation (Wincent et al., 2010). In appointing board members, firms 
therefore pay attention to the resource provision function of the board and aim to enhance the 
board and therefore the firm‟s SC by appointing experienced executives with a track record 
and reputation within their industry (Haynes and Hillman, 2010). To achieve prominence in 
the interlock directorate network, firms appoint members who sit on boards of other reputable 
companies thus providing the focal firm board with direct and indirect benefits of information 
and knowledge access. The web of relationships in the interlock directorate network 
facilitates the exchange of fine grained information about the industry trends and strategies 
that would be of benefit to firms considering entering into or managing strategic inter-firm 
relationships. A directors‟ prominence and therefore the extant of information and knowledge 
benefits arising from their network, depends on the boards they sit on directly, and also on 
third party links through other co-directors. Therefore, the boards on which prominent 
directors sit on, achieve prominent positions in the interlock directorate network and are 
perceived to be of high quality (Haynes and Hillman, 2010). Summarizing, a firm with a 
prominent board is a firm whose directors are on average highly connected with other firms 
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and, therefore are well informed about technology and market trends, opportunities and 
threats. Furthermore, such directors have vast experience in board decision-making issues and 
have solid reputations, so that they are likely to act more independently from the firm's 
management since they are careful to make decisions that do not alter their own reputations. 
At the same time we know that having a prominent position in the inter-firm network involves 
managers dealing with more specific and operative information. Indeed, although inter-firm 
agreements are often decided at board level, the execution of such agreements allow product 
managers to exchange specific information concerning therapeutic areas, technologies, 
intermediate products (such as genes and proteins), patents and manufacturing processes. 
Although such information is broadly advantageous for NPD (Mazzola et al., 2015), there are 
some possible drawbacks (Vanhaverbeke et al., 2009; Malik, 2011) mainly related to high 
volumes of information to be processed and excessive information specialization (Koka and 
Prescott, 2002). Processing high volumes of information might have adverse consequences 
when it is necessary to make fast decisions such as in NPD process contexts (Eisenhardt, 
1989). Such adverse consequences might arise from the necessity to scan high information 
volumes resulting from being prominent and the need to filter redundant information, certify 
information flows as trustworthy and of high quality and suitable for the NPD process (Koka 
and Prescott, 2002). Finally, there is a tendency for excessive information specialization in 
firms with highly prominent positions in the inter-firm relationship network, which can limit 
the scope for the exploration of new markets and new solutions that often are required to 
develop new products (Sammarra and Biggiero, 2008; Vanhaverbeke et al., 2009; Malik, 
2011).  
We argue that a prominent board counterweighs such drawbacks when they occur in inter-
firm networks by improving the effectiveness of information obtained in structural inter-firm 
network positions. Indeed, while occupying a prominent position in the inter-firm network 
allows product managers to acquire specific knowledge and information that are closely 
 11 
related to product development  (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Gulati, 1999; Gulati et al., 2000; 
Koka and Prescott, 2002), board prominence, being related to board directors, mainly 
concerns wide and deep industrial knowledge. Board directors are therefore able to help the 
management of the firm to filter redundant information and certify incoming knowledge as 
legitimate and potentially useful for NPD.  Indeed, prominent directors are more 
knowledgeable about technology and market trends in the industry which are needed to 
develop new products (Mizruchi, 1996). For example, in the biopharmaceutical sector, 
prominent directors are more likely to be well-informed about the latest technology trends, the 
most promising patents in the industry, or the new approaches in drug discovery other 
companies are investing in. Thus, a prominent board, functioning as a filtering mechanism, 
reduces the cost of finding useful information from the redundancy provided by the firm„s 
prominence in the inter-firm ties network. Also, thanks to prominent directors, product 
development teams are able to focus on a set of shared knowledge and similar capabilities that 
enhance the speed of NPD (Rindfleisch and Moorman, 2001). Furthermore, prominent 
directors help in certifying information as legitimate for NPD. Indeed, we can expect 
prominent directors to take great care in evaluating board proposals because their own 
personal reputation is at risk (Podolny, 2001). Because prominent boards are made up of 
executives with a successful track record and status (Ozmel et al., 2013), they are careful not 
to be associated with bad decisions that can damage their own reputation. Such directors are 
in a good position to better evaluate objectively the reliability, the accuracy and the quality of 
information from inter-firm network sources. In doing so, prominent directors act as 
knowledge brokers that certify the available information that enhances NPD processes of the 
firm (Hargadon, 1998).  
Furthermore, it is highly likely that prominent directors‟ experiences and connections 
span different industries from those tied directly or indirectly to the focal firm. Thus, 
prominent directors are a possible source of additional information that reduces the risk of 
 12 
excessive information specialization and allows the focal firm to better explore new markets 
and technologies and ultimately to improve its NPD processes (Katila and Ahuia, 2002). 
Finally, prominent directors are likely to use knowledge structures developed from their 
experience on other boards for speeding up decision-making processes and, particularly, new 
product development initiatives (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001).  For instance, Useem (1982) 
observed that executives use their board appointments as a way to scan the environment for 
timely and pertinent information. Similarly, directors can learn about the efficacy of different 
practices and how to implement them properly by observing the consequences of management 
decisions (Haunschild, 1993).  
Hence, from the foregoing we can posit that:  
H1. The interaction between a prominent board in the interlocking directorate network and a 
prominent position in its inter-firm relationship network is positively related to new product 
development. 
 
A firm that bridges structural holes is able to access potentially novel and diverse information 
from remote parts of its network that can enhance the firm‟s performance (Burt, 1992; 
McEvily and Zaheer, 1999). Nevertheless, information obtained from bridging structural 
holes is often distant and diverse from the core business of the firm. So, in such cases, 
searching for valuable information through structural holes may actually reduce rather 
enhance the propensity of the firm to develop new products. In addition to the challenge of 
dealing with many non-redundant and weak ties, firms may also have to handle diverse 
information effectively (Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001). Most focal firms are limited in their 
ability to recognize, assimilate, transform, and exploit distant and diverse knowledge for 
effective product development (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Such limits result in excess 
information that lead to dis-economies of scale in their innovation effort (Shipilov, 2009). 
Moreover, when knowledge components become more diverse, the lack of specialization and 
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focus make the recombination of this knowledge into new valuable ideas difficult – thus 
potentially decreasing the product development rate (Brusoni et al., 2001).  
We argue that having prominent directors may help the focal firm deal with the 
possible drawbacks of inter-firm structural holes positions. Indeed, prominent boards – made 
up of prominent directors - act as channels of potentially valuable information to the focal 
firm that mitigate the impact of these drawbacks in two ways: firstly, counteracting the 
aforementioned drawbacks, and secondly adding complementary information. The 
counteracting effect happens in three ways. First, prominent directors can reduce the 
information asymmetry between distant ties in the inter-firm network. Prominent directors act 
as competent interpreters of information that is far from the core business of the firm and thus 
help the management to better understand and evaluate any “distant” information for the 
purpose of developing new products. Second, prominent directors help the focal firm to 
reduce the risk related with distant information because such directors are likely to be more 
aware of possible threats or failures experienced by other firms when dealing with “distant” 
information. Prominent directors can alert management of possible risks of failure involving 
certain NPD projects and in this way help the firm to avoid high risk paths. Finally, as well 
argued by Hoskisson et al. (2002), a director with a deeper knowledge of the market, also for 
the reasons previously mentioned, perceives less risk in product development projects and 
therefore is generally more willing to adopt NPD strategies.  
Additionally, prominent directors play a complementary role of providing the volume 
of information that is sometimes missing when firms bridge structural holes. Management can 
then have a mix of “close” (from the directors) and “distant” (from the firm„s structural holes 
position) information. This combination means the firm has sufficient "search depth" and 
"search scope" processes that are well known to be necessary for effective new product 
development (Katila and Ahuia, 2002).  
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In summary, a prominent board overcomes two limitations of the structural holes 
position of the firm in improving product development: firstly, a prominent board contributes 
by reducing search costs and risk related with “distant” information absorption; secondly, the 
board supplies information volume that the firm may not have or obtain from bridging 
structural holes.  
We, therefore, expect that: 
H2. The interaction between a prominent board in the interlocking directorate network and a 
firm bridging structural holes position in its inter-firm relationship network is positively 
related to the new product development. 
 
3. Research method 
3.1 Sample and Data 
The research setting for this study is the biopharmaceutical industry. We chose this context 
for a number of reasons. First, biopharmaceutical companies are knowledge-based firms 
involved in complex R&D processes (Salman and Saives, 2005). In addition, previous 
literature recognizes this industry as an appropriate context for studying innovation 
performance (Powell et al, 1996; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). Moreover, the 
biopharmaceutical sector is characterized by long gestation periods in product development, 
multiple stakeholders and complex interactions among several parties that influence the 
innovation processes (Rothaermel, 2001; McCutchen and Swamidass, 2004). From the first 
stage of the drug development process to commercialization, the biopharmaceutical industry 
is characterized by an extensive use of inter-firm agreements (Powell et al., 1996; Billitteri et 
al., 2013). The biopharmaceutical industry has the highest absolute number of cooperative 
agreements and accounts for 20% of all strategic alliances (Rothaermel, 2001) and is thus a 
relevant arena for studying inter-firm relationships. 
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We collected data from multiple sources. We obtained data on inter-firm 
collaborations from the BioWorld database, a comprehensive database covering the global 
biopharmaceutical industry. BioWorld is used in different studies (e.g. Birch, 2008). We 
retrieved data on NPD from the “Biotech Products” section of the BioWorld database. The 
patenting data is retrieved from the US Patents Office database, while the director data and all 
the firm-attribute data are obtained from the companies‟ annual reports.  
We built our database in several steps. The first step consisted of collecting records of 
inter-firm collaborations1 between biotech2 companies over the years 2006-2010. We 
obtained 1,758 agreements from 1,890 biotechnology firms. In the second step, following past 
research in a similar research context (Stuart et al., 2007; Phelps, 2010; Malik, 2011), we 
limited the sample frame to public companies to ensure the availability and reliability of firm-
attribute data. Then, from the full dataset of 1,890 companies, we confined our sample to 
public companies, specifically 544 firms. Since we selected all the public companies in the set 
of 1,890 companies, no selection-bias can be associated with our sample. In the third step we 
matched the inter-firm collaborations data to the directors data. This step resulted in a further 
reduction of the sample for the following reasons. First, we included in our analysis only 
those firms with a significant board dimension. We therefore restricted the sample to those 
firms with more than 3 directors on their board. Second, we excluded firms that went public 
in the observation period (2006-2010). Third, we excluded firms for which we did not have 
full information about their directors‟ names. Using the above criteria we obtained a final 
sample of 300 public companies.  
As for the interlocking director network, we obtained information on boards of 
directors of publicly held companies from the firms‟ annual reports for the years 2006-2010. 
We constructed the director network measure following an already applied methodology 
                                                        
1
 Inter-firm collaborations in our study include: licencing agreements, acquisition/selling of R&D or 
manufacturing services, R&D collaborations, minority equity agreements. 
2
 As biotech company we mean both pure biotechnological and biopharmaceutical. 
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(Omer et al., 2013). The total number of directors who served on the boards of the 300 firms 
in our sample during the 2006-2010 periods is 4,323. We built an annual matrix of director 
networks that mapped the connections between the different directors based on whether they 
sat on the same company board. Thus, for each firm and each year in our sample, we obtained 
data on the individual directors who serve on the 300 firm‟s board.  
 
3.2 Measurements 
3.2.1 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable in this study is the new product development rate of a biotech 
company. We focused on NPD due to the following rationale. First, SC literature has 
specifically investigated the effect of network positions on patenting propensity but 
disregarded examining the impact of network positions on NPD. Moreover, in the 
biopharmaceutical context, NPD is a direct measure of how well a firm performs within a new 
technological paradigm in the final market. Developing new products is increasingly a focal 
point of competition and often requires the development and successful implementation of 
novel process technologies (Pisano, 1990). In the biopharmaceutical industry, introducing a 
new drug in the market allows the firm to gain monopoly profits for 10-15 years ensuring in 
this way cash, market share and getting reputation (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988). 
Several scholars within this industry assume the number of new products developed as a 
measure of innovation performance (Rothaermel, 2001; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004; 
Kalaignanam and Shankar, 2007; Bianchi et al., 2011). We operationalized the dependent 
variable by counting the number of new biopharmaceutical products (New products) a biotech 
firm has introduced into the market throughout 2010-2012.  
Because numerous biotech companies may not have a new drug marketed every year, 
a 3-years window for developing new products attenuates annual fluctuations and may 
capture a biopharmaceutical firm‟s product development propensity more accurately. To 
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assess different lag specifications between the explanatory variables (inter-firm network 
positions and interlocking directorate network position) and the dependent variable (new 
product development) we applied an approach quite adopted in literature - the dependent 
variable consists of observations over the 3 years (i.e. 2010-2012) following the 5 years of 
company-level agreement observations (2006-2010) (Bae and Gargiulo, 2004; Rothaermel 
and Deeds, 2004; Padula, 2008; Phelps, 2010; Vanhaverbeke et al., 2012).  
 
3.2.2 Independent variables 
To best capture the notion of prominence in our theoretical framework, we used eigenvector 
centrality because it is a more involved measure that utilizes the intensity of the relationships 
to calculate centrality (Bonacich, 1987; Ruhnau, 2000; Bonacich, 2007). We have chosen this 
measure of centrality for several reasons. First, eigenvector centrality considers both direct 
and indirect company ties, i.e. it accounts for the case in which a company is highly central 
with only a few ties, but is also connected to indirectly highly central firms within the 
network. Second, eigenvector centrality is a good measure of information volume channelled 
to the ego firm both from direct and indirect ties (Koka and Prescott, 2002). Third, 
eigenvector centrality has been associated with status accumulation in a network – a key 
feature of prominent positions (Shipilov and Li, 2008). Finally, in SC literature, this measure 
has been often related to innovation performance (Ahuja, 2000; Salman and Saives, 2005; 
Padula, 2008).  
 The second inter-firm network structure measure seeks to assess the extent to which a 
biopharmaceutical company does or does not bridge structural holes (Str_holes). We assessed 
the presence or the absence of structural holes in the overall network of ties among firms. We 
calculated this variable as one minus the firm‟s constraint score (in cases where constraint 
was non-zero) and zero for all other cases, because a score of zero in our network happens 
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only when the firm is unconnected to others, so it has no access to structural holes. This 
measure of structural holes is extensively used in SC literature (Zaheer and Bell, 2005).  
 In order to compute the eigenvector centrality and the structural holes measures of 
each of the 300 firms, we used all the inter-firm collaborations within the full dataset, i.e. 
1,758 agreements. We recorded each agreement in five binary n×n (one per observed years) 
adjacency matrixes, At, where nt is the number of firms and t is the year within the range 
2006-2010. For each matrix, the term Atij is set to 1 if the company i and company j signed an 
agreement in the year t, 0 otherwise. Then, by using UCINET (Borgatti et al., 2002), a 
network analysis program that computes network variables using dyadic data, we computed 
the eigenvector centrality (Eigent) and structural holes (Str_holest) for each firm in the 
network at year t. We then computed the average value of eigenvector centrality (Eigen) and 
structural holes (Str_holes) for each of the 300 firms over the five years of observations 
(2006-2010).  
 With regards to the interlocking directorate network centrality measure, we selected 
the eigenvector centrality measure because it reflects not only the number of direct links a 
given director has developed, but also the number of links developed by the directors to 
whom the given director is connected (Larcker et al., 2013; Li et al., 2013). Consequently, the 
bigger the eigenvector centrality measure the larger the amount of direct or indirect access 
and the potential quantity of information flow to or from a given director. Additionally, 
eigenvector centrality signals the status of an individual in networks of social relationships 
(Ozmel, Reuer and Gulati, 2003) a feature that, as previously explained, puts a director in a 
good position to filter, assess and legitimize information coming from the firm's network.  
 The interlocking directorate network of each of the 300 firms was computed using the 
4,323 directors who serve on the boards of the 300 firms in the 2006-2010 period. We 
constructed five binary n×n (one per observed years) adjacency matrixes, Bt, where nt is the 
number of directors and t is the year in the interval 2006-2010. For each matrix, the term Btij 
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is set to 1 if director i and director j sat on the same board in the year t, 0 otherwise. Then, by 
using the software UCINET we computed the eigenvector centrality for each director in the 
network at year t. This measure is calculated at director level; this allows us to include the 
inter-personal network of each individual director thus extending the analysis beyond any 
specific board on which they may be seating (Omer et al., 2013). Since our unit of analysis is 
the company, we computed the eigenvector centrality of the firm‟s board by averaging the 
eigenvector centrality of all the directors sitting on each specific company board. Thus, the 
variable Interlock_Eigent is the average (multiplied by 1,000 for scaling reasons) of the 
eigenvalue centrality of the interlocks of all the directors sitting on a company board for each 
firm at time t.  Additionally, since we work on a 5-year observation period, we computed the 
average value of Interlock_Eigent over the five years of observations (2006-2010), and we 
indicate this average as Interlock_Eigen. Finally, since the variable Interlock_Eigen presents 
high levels of dispersion, we log-transformed the variable, and this actually improved the 
model fitting.  
 
3.2.3 Control variables 
We included several control variables that may impact the propensity to develop new 
products. First of all, we controlled for the firm‟s innovativeness by including a count variable 
of its patents received in the thirty years prior to 2010 (patent stock). We also included the 
natural logarithm of the average number of employees of each firm over the period 2006-2010 
as a proxy for firm size (Ahuja, 2000). R&D Expenditures were included as the natural 
logarithm of average R&D expenditures in the years 2006-2010 (Bae and Gargiulo, 2004). 
We also controlled for industry, a dummy variable that indicates whether a company is a pure 
biotechnological or a biopharmaceutical one (Vanhaverbeke et al., 2009; Billitteri et al., 
2013). Finally, we included a dummy variable (nationality) to distinguish between US-based 
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and non-US biotechnology companies (1 = US firm) to control for nationality differences 
(Ahuja, 2000; Vanhaverbeke et al., 2012).  
 
3.2.4. Model specification  
In this study the dependent variable, New products, is a ‗count‘ variable, which takes only 
discrete nonnegative integer values, and has possibly a large number of zero values. In order 
to select the best fitting approach for our count model we carried out an extensive analysis of 
the data. First, we took account of the general caution to adopt an OLS regression in count 
data. As shown in the histogram depicted in Figure 1, our dependent variable is strongly 
skewed to the right, so clearly OLS regression would be inappropriate.  
 
 
Figure 1. New Products variable distribution 
 
Second, count data often follow a poisson distribution, but since over-dispersion is a possible 
problem with poisson regression (Hausman et al. 1984), we conducted tests to assess over-
dispersion for the basic poisson specification (Cameron and Trivedi, 1986). We tested the 
poisson assumption (equality of mean and variance) against the negative binomial model, by 
using the ―gof‖ command powered by STATA software that tests the Poisson goodness-of-fit. 
We obtained small value for chi-square in the ―gof‖, meaning that the poisson distribution is a 
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good choice. We tested each model reported in Table 2 and all models exhibit a non-
significant over-dispersion
3
.  
In addition, we also checked for the percentage of data points of the dependent 
variable that take the value 0, and this percentage is quite high (85%). Theory suggests that a 
separate process from the count values could generate the excess zeros, so the excess zeros 
should be modeled independently. In our context the only phenomenon that could generate a 
separate process is the industry effect. Indeed, since both pharmaceutical and biotechnological 
companies constitute our sample, it should be possible that several biotech companies do not 
develop products in the time horizon (since for example they are focused on developing new 
patents). Thus, in order to strengthen the choice of the poisson model, we also run the Zero-
Inflated Poisson (ZIP) model
4
. We test the zero-inflated model versus the standard poisson 
model by using the ―vuong‖ command powered by STATA software. We gained a non-
significant z-test, meaning that the poisson model is better.  
Finally, as a further robustness check we ran a Probit regression by using the 
dichotomized variable of the dependent variable New Products. Also this model confirms the 
poisson results. Thus, following the results of the previous tests (gof and vuong), we can 
conclude in favor of the poisson specification.  
 
4. Results 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix of all the different 
variables. The correlation matrix shows that all variables have values of correlation, which 
should not raise multicollinearity problems among the variables. We controlled for 
multicollinearity problems among variables by calculating the VIF (variance inflation factor) 
                                                        
3
 We have double-checked our results by using a negative binomial estimator to fit the new product models, 
which accommodates over-dispersed data. Using negative binomial regression (robust standard errors), all 
variables retain the same sign and the same significance.  
4
 We excluded the zero-inflated negative binomial regression model since from the previous poisson goodness of 
fit test we found that poisson specification has a better model fit than the negative binomial specification. 
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a more advanced measure of multicollinearity than simple correlations (Stevens, 1992). As 
showed in Table 1, all the VIF values are below the critical level, indicating that the 
explanatory variables can simultaneously be included in the models (Gujarati, 1995). Finally, 
we also control for heteroskedasticity problems. Running the White test (White, 1980) for 
detecting heteroskedasticity we assessed that our data experience heteroskedasticity problems, 
that we have corrected using the robust standard error when running the regressions. 
 
 Mean SD Min Max (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) VIF 
1. New products 0.27 0.91 0 11 1.00          
2. Patent stock 120.11 430.81 0 3359 0.40
*
 1.00        1.58 
3. Size 4.48 2.43 0.28 11.5 0.28
*
 0.47
*
 1.00       1.97 
4. R&D Expenditures 3.17 1.76 0 9.01 0.35
*
 0.49
*
 0.67
*
 1.00      2.02 
5. Industry 0.61 0.48 0 1 -0.01 0.06 0.11 0.07 1.00     1.13 
6. Nationality 0.36 0.48 0 1 -0.09 -0.06 -0.04 -0.06 -0.12
*
 1.00    1.02 
7. Eigen 1.75 4.52 0 47.1 0.52
*
 0.31
*
 0.23
*
 0.25 -0.19
*
 -0.01 1.00   1.32 
8. Str_holes 0.46 0.33 0 1 0.18
*
 0.17
*
 0.16
*
 0.21 -0.22
*
 0.02 0.35
*
 1.00  1.22 
9. Interlock_Eigen 0.22 0.65 0 5.11 0.37
*
 0.43
*
 0.32
*
 0.32 0.02 -0.07 0.29
*
 0.15
*
 1.00 1.31 
†
p <  0.10, *p <  0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p <  0.001 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
 
Table 2 provides an overview of the results of poisson regression analysis. We used 
hierarchical entry of the independent variables in the regression models. Model 1, in Table 2, 
is a base model in which only the controls were included. In model 2 we introduced the inter-
firm network position measure eigenvector centrality (Eigen), while in Model 3 we 
introduced the board eigenvector centrality (Interlock_Eigen) of each firm. The fourth model 
shows the results of the first two-way interaction term, i.e. EigenXInterlock_Eigen.  
In model 5 we introduced the second inter-firm network position structural holes 
(Str_holes). In model 6 we included both structural holes (Str_holes) variable and board 
eigenvector centrality (Interlock_Eigen), while in the seventh model we introduced the second 
two-way interaction term, i.e. Str_holesXInterlock_Eigen. In model 8 we entered both the 
inter-firm network variables, while in model 9 we entered both the inter-firm network 
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variables and the board eigenvector centrality variable. Finally, in model 10 we reported the 
results when all the variables and the two interaction terms are entered simultaneously.  
Since the interaction term may be highly correlated with the first-order predictor 
variable from which it is derived, to create all the interaction items we mean-centered the 
first-order variables Eigen, Str_holes, Interlock_Eigen to reduce any potential 
multicollinearity (Little et al., 2006). Considering the overall fit of each model, we observed 
that the introduction of the inter-firm network measures significantly improves the fit. 
Another significant improvement occurs with the introduction of the two interaction effects 
(see Table 2 below). 
The analysis of the results of the control variables in model 1 show that R&D 
expenditures variable has a positive and significant effect on the number of new 
biopharmaceutical products introduced in the market. The coefficient of the variable size is 
statistically significant only in the full model 10, so no significant contribution derives from 
this variable on the dependent one. The nationality variable is negative and significant; thus 
US firms develop more biotech products. Finally, the coefficient of patent stock is significant 
and negative, meaning that companies in this sector seem to specialize in developing and 
selling patents and may neglect the development of new biopharmaceutical products. 
As shown in model 2 of Table 2, the variable Eigen has a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient. This result is in line with past research that also found that a centrally 
located firm in its inter-firm network develops more new products. Similarly, in model 5, the 
variable Str_holes is positive though weakly statistically significant. The board centrality 
measure, Interlock_Eigen, is significant and positively related to NPD as shown in both 
model 3 and model 6 of Table 2. This confirms that a board that is highly connected in the 
interlocking directorate network increases the likely to develop new products (Wincent et al., 
2010). 
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[Please insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Regarding H1, we expected a positive interaction effect between inter-firm network centrality 
and board interlock network centrality. As shown in model 4, Table 2, the interaction term 
(Eigen X Interlock_Eigen) is positive and strongly significant as expected and so H1 is 
confirmed. For H2 we predicted a positive interaction effect between inter-firm structural 
holes position and board interlock centrality. As shown in model 5, Table 2, the interaction 
term (Str_holes X Interlock_Eigen) is positive and significant, thus confirming H2. Finally, 
when we added simultaneously all the interaction terms in model 10, only the interaction term 
Eigen X Interlock_Eigen remained significant and positive.  
In addition, as also suggested by Jaccard and Turrisi (2003), to provide even more 
interesting insights on the magnitude of the moderation effects we carried out a deeper 
analysis whose results are shown as plots in Figures 2a and 2b.  
 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 2. (a) Effect of Interlock_Eigen and Eig on new product development. (b) 
Effect of Interlock_Eigen and Hl on new product development.  
 
Figure 2a plots the effect of the interaction on predicted values of new products of 
eigenvector centrality and interlock eigenvector centrality. In line with Schilling and Phelps 
(2007), the ―Low Interlock_Eigen‖ line shows the slope of the effect of Eig on New Products 
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when the value of Interlock_Eigen is set to one standard deviation below its mean. The ―High 
Interlock_Eigen‖ line represents the effect of Eig on New Products when the value of 
Interlock_Eigen is set to one standard deviation above its mean. Finally, the ―Medium 
Interlock_Eigen‖ line is the effect of Eig on New Products when the value of Interlock_Eigen 
is set to its mean. Moreover, the end points of the three lines are calculated at one standard 
deviation below (Low Eig) and above (High Eig) the mean of eigenvector centrality. 
Consistent with the results in Model 4 of Table 2, the plot of figure 1b suggests that a high 
level of eigenvector centrality in the inter-firm networks should be accompanied by a high 
level of eigenvector centrality in the interlocking directorate networks, if the objective is to 
accelerate the effect of firm‘s eigenvector centrality on the propensity to develop new 
products. Figure 2b plots the effect of Structural holes on the predicted values of new 
products for the same three values of interlocking eigenvector centrality calculated as before. 
Also for this plot, the end points of the lines are calculated at one standard deviation below 
(Low Hl) and above (High Hl) the mean of structural holes. Consistent with the results in 
Model 7 of Table 2, the plot of figure 1b shows how combining a high degree of structural 
holes in inter-firm network and a high level of interlocking eigenvector centrality increases 
the propensity to develop new products. We can conclude that the strength of the relationships 
(i.e. increased slope of the plots) between new product development and eigenvector 
centrality and new product development and structural holes are greater when 
Interlock_Eigen is high. In other words, Interlock_Eigen strengthens these relationships.  
 
5. Discussions and conclusion  
The present study adds to a recent trend in SC research that seeks to investigate how and why 
business outcomes are achieved through multiple networks (Ozmel et al, 2013; Wang et al., 
2014). We do this by studying how inter-personal networks interact with inter-firm networks 
to achieve innovation outcomes of new product development. In particular, our study focused 
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on how prominence in the directors‟ interlock network relates to information sourced from 
different inter-firm network positions, a mechanism that has not been explored so far in past 
studies. Our study explains why and how this interaction exists and the empirical analysis 
indicates that this interaction is useful for effective NPD.  
Indeed, this is the subject of the hypotheses developed in the study - H1 and H2. 
Concerning H1, we found that prominent boards channel potentially valuable information to 
mitigate drawbacks experienced by prominent firms in inter-firm networks and in this way 
positively accelerate the ability to develop new products. The model results, strengthen by 
analysis depicted in figure 2a, seem to support our argument that a prominent board filters 
information flowing through the inter-firm network for its suitability, reliability and quality 
and does so cost effectively. Furthermore, the board itself is a source of valuable information 
and can fill in information gaps reducing any overspecialization risk related with prominent 
positions in the inter-firm network. 
The second hypothesis (H2) predicted a positive interaction effect between a 
prominent board and the structural holes position of the firm in its inter-firm network. The 
results confirmed H2 and graphical illustrations in figure 2b also showed a noticeable link 
between prominent boards (high levels of board eigenvector centrality) and firm‟s structural 
holes position in the inter-firm network in accelerating NPD. The results support our intuition 
that, a prominent board plays a complementary and counteracting role when the firm exploits 
information from its structural holes position. A prominent board fills in information volume 
gaps in cases where the ego firm is rich in diverse information from its structural holes 
position in the network of inter-firm ties but has no sufficient internal knowledge depth to 
deal with such external diversity. In addition, a prominent board helps managers to reduce the 
information asymmetry embedded in diverse information, helping in this way to reduce the 
risk of processing diverse information provided by the structural holes position of the firm. 
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Furthermore, our results confirm the recent findings about the impact of prominent 
and structural holes positions in the inter-firm network on NPD. First, we find a positive 
impact of prominent position on NPD in line with recent findings obtained by Mazzola et al. 
(2015). Second, we also obtain confirmation of the positive impact of bridging structural 
holes in the inter-firm network on NPD. This is also in line with the theoretical framework of 
Mazzola et al. (2015), even though the authors do not obtain an empirical confirmation for 
their hypothesis. Thus, our results reinforce those of studies that have recently attempted to 
investigate the impact of some inter-firm network positions to NPD performance.  
Moreover, this study offers important managerial implications. First, in line with 
previous studies (Wincent et al., 2010; Mazzola et al., 2015), we confirm the importance of 
networking positioning, both in the interlock directorates and inter-firm networks, for 
improving firm's performance such as NPD. Furthermore, our results seem to indicate that 
having prominent directors within the board are beneficial for prominent firms. What our 
study shows is that a prominent board is even more important when the firm also has 
prominence in the network of inter-firm ties. A prominent board‟s role then includes a 
counteracting one to mitigate possible drawbacks the firm encounters as the firm accumulates 
more strategic resources via its growing network. The implication is that firms have to 
consider carefully board compositions with regard to the total board capital available, 
including social capital that considers the depth and breadth of the firm‟s interlocking 
directorate network (Haynes and Hillman, 2010). Furthermore, we have discussed how 
interlock directorate and inter-firm networks involve persons at different levels of hierarchy 
and hence possibly also different source of information. From a managerial perspective this 
means that firms who are able to better integrate directors and product managers knowledge 
gain more advantage in terms of NPD performance. Thus, even if our work is not focused on 
analyzing the process through which firms integrate board interlock network information with 
inter-firm network information, it highlights the managerial importance of establishing such 
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integration process in the firm. Some other interesting managerial implications come from the 
analysis of the result of the control variables. Indeed, our results confirm that in the 
biopharmaceutical industry firms who specialize on patent production tend to sell them as 
intermediate products and therefore they may neglect to develop new products (Phelps, 2010).       
  A further consideration concerns the interesting research field opened by the present 
study, i.e. the analysis of the interactions between inter-firm and inter-personal networks. 
There are several interesting issues that could be further investigated along this direction. One 
future research direction could be to evaluate the impact of the above interaction on other 
forms of firm performance; another path of investigation would be the analysis of the 
moderating role of each director's network on the relationship between inter-firm network 
position and innovation performance.  
Finally, an additional interesting source of further investigation arises from the 
comparison of the magnitude and significance of the two interaction effects. Comparing 
Figure 2a and 2b, it becomes apparent that the influence of a prominent board is much 
stronger on prominent positions of the firm than on the structural holes ones. The analysis of 
the levels of significance in model 10 also shows that the interaction term 
Str_holesXInterlock_Eigen is no longer significant. Although this result may arise from the 
differences in impact of inter-firm eigenvector and structural holes on the NPD, as clearly 
shown in model 8 (where both Eigen and Str_holes are significant, but the first has a stronger 
level of significance), the result is quite unexpected. This result is surprising because, 
according to our theorizing a prominent board that interacts an inter-firm structural holes 
position has a double effect on the NPD performance, i.e. counteracting possible drawback of 
the inter-firm structural holes feature and a complementary role. Thus, this result merits 
further investigations which may involve the measurement of actual inter-tie flows. 
Like all studies, this one has several limitations that further research should overcome. 
Firstly, network theory runs the risk of confusing network positions themselves as benefits 
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and not as sources of benefits to focal firms (Koka and Prescott, 2002). This is because most 
network studies do not measure the actual benefits of network positions i.e. information or 
knowledge or resource flows. This is a major weakness in network literature. Although our 
study does not measure information flows, we move forward network research by empirically 
validating hypothesized flows of information benefits and how they may interact in product 
development. However, a deeper stage of investigation could concern how the interaction of 
the two flows of information actually happens in the firm. This would imply a survey analysis 
to understand how board directors and management exchange information coming from their 
respective networks.  
A second limitation is relevant to the innovation performance measure we have used. 
Indeed, researchers often capture innovation performance with different innovation outcomes 
such as new developed products, number of patents and patent citations. In this paper we 
adopted only a NPD perspective to verify our theoretical framework. Thus, the interpretation 
of the results can be different in cases where other innovation measures are employed. 
Moreover, the same potential problem of misspecification may exist since we do not consider 
other perspectives of SC. In this work we addressed only one dimension of SC, i.e. structural 
embeddedness (measured as centrality and structural holes) and we have neglected the 
relational embeddedness dimension of SC - that is empirically also recognized as a significant 
influence of the firm‟s performance (Gulati, 1995; Soh, 2003). Finally, this study focuses on 
biopharmaceutical companies. Although the context is surely appropriate for the issues under 
investigations, it would be unwise to generalize the findings too broadly to other industries. 
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New products 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Patent Stock 0.000138 -0.000225 -0.000463* -0.000495* 0.0000478 -0.000134 -0.000175 -0.000260+ -0.000464* -0.000504** 
 (0.000224) (0.000163) (0.000207) (0.000215) (0.000228) (0.000245) (0.000169) (0.000157) (0.000197) (0.000175) 
Size -0.0819 0.0331 -0.0247 -0.134 -0.0702 -0.103 -0.125 0.0360 -0.0165 -0.144+ 
 (0.189) (0.174) (0.106) (0.0822) (0.198) (0.160) (0.0837) (0.176) (0.108) (0.0807) 
R&D Expenditures 0.660* 0.481+ 0.539** 0.799*** 0.624+ 0.633* 0.679*** 0.470 0.521** 0.812*** 
 (0.320) (0.297) (0.186) (0.159) (0.337) (0.289) (0.125) (0.303) (0.190) (0.145) 
Industry -0.290 0.401 0.322 0.258 -0.0494 -0.160 0.00840 0.536 0.420 0.396 
 (0.362) (0.407) (0.385) (0.374) (0.349) (0.371) (0.293) (0.380) (0.370) (0.347) 
Nationality -0.838* -0.668+ -0.601+ -0.764* -0.711* -0.634+ -0.443 -0.631+ -0.584+ -0.639+ 
 (0.369) (0.349) (0.334) (0.378) (0.345) (0.335) (0.340) (0.333) (0.325) (0.362) 
Eigen  0.0582** 0.0566*** -0.0145    0.0533** 0.0528*** -0.0167 
  (0.0188) (0.0153) (0.0254)    (0.0181) (0.0152) (0.0232) 
Interlock_Eigen   0.454*** 0.279*  0.396* -0.800  0.416** -0.117 
   (0.137) (0.119)  (0.179) (0.634)  (0.137) (0.306) 
EigenXInterlock_Eigen    0.125***      0.108** 
    (0.0320)      (0.0331) 
Str_holes     1.170* 0.984+ 1.027+ 0.889+ 0.657 0.887+ 
     (0.556) (0.535) (0.588) (0.500) (0.494) (0.490) 
Str_holesXInterlock_Eigen       0.747*   0.241 
       (0.344)   (0.193) 
Constant -3.276*** -3.738*** -3.809*** -4.073*** -4.009*** -3.862*** -3.996*** -4.282*** -4.182*** -4.605*** 
 (0.625) (0.513) (0.479) (0.419) (0.654) (0.679) (0.586) (0.592) (0.585) (0.544) 
N 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 
Wald chi2 69.63 547.80 478.48 539.35 87.23 95.12 116.52 447.56 403.71 526.51 
Log pseudolikelihood -168.96 -158.37 -150.41 -143.52 -164.60 -158.26 -147.67 -155.83 -149.10 -139.601 
Robust Standard errors in parentheses †p <  0.10, *p <  0.05, **p <  0.01, ***p <  0.001 
Table 2. Results of the Poisson analysis 
 
